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Abstract. Theoretical models of the Kuznets Curve have been purely
analytical with little contribution to the timing of the process and to
the presence of additional mechanisms affecting its timing. This paper
proposes an agent-based version of Acemoglu and Robinsons model of
the political economy of the Kuznets Curve. In extending their analytical
framework we include heterogeneity of agents’ income and a mating
mechanism that together represent elements of social mobility. These
two simple changes proved to be enough to shed light on the length and
timing before high inequality implies regime change. Thus, this work may
contribute to an effective empirical assessment of the Kuznets curve as it
explicitly considers the time dimension of the process and the effects of
considering social dynamics.
1 Introduction
In 1955 Simon Kuznets hypothesized that there exists an inverse U-shaped pattern
in long-run processes of economic development [12]; that is, economic inequality
increases as an economy develops, before decreasing after a certain level of income
is reached. Although the hypothesis has been subjected to extensive examination,
there remain many open questions in relation to this theory. In particular, these
questions relate to: a) evidence for the theory’s empirical validity; b) theory
explaining why the curve arises; and c) shape and onset of the curve in different
countries.
In their 2002 paper, Acemoglu and Robinson [2] (AR) offer a political economy
theory of the Kuznets Curve. They propose that ”capitalist industrialization tends
to increase inequality, but this inequality contains the seeds of its own destruction,
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because it induces a change in the political regime toward a more redistributive
system” [2, p. 184]. In contrast to other theories they argue instead that political
factors and institutional change are crucial. They model redistribution and the
associated reduction in inequality as a process where poor agents force political
instability and the political elites extend redistribution through taxation to avoid
a revolution. Society, therefore, moves from an autocratic to a democratic regime.
However, they make several unrealistic assumptions in their analytical model
and do not consider the dynamics of the Kuznets Curve explicitly. In this paper,
we take their paper as a starting point and formalize their interpretation of the
Kuznets Curve in an agent-based model. This allows us to explore the effects of
relaxing some of the assumptions made on the shape and onset of the Kuznets
curve and to consider the time dimension explicitly. Specifically, we extend the
model to include heterogeneity in the agents (both poor and rich) by allowing
for an income distribution, and we include also a mating mechanism that allows
mobility between the two classes, rich and poor, via the social institution of
marriage.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present an overview of the
current literature highlighting gaps in the theory, and consider the discussion
related to the existing empirical evidence on the Kuznets Curve. In section 3
we develop the model, showing both the features that we reproduce and those
we introduce as novel. Section 4 covers assumptions and special cases. Section 5
describes the implementation of the agent-based model. Section 6 presents the
parameterization, a brief sensitivity analysis and the results. We conclude the
paper in section 7.
2 Literature survey
In his original paper, Kuznets [12] used time series data for England, USA and
Germany for the formulation of his stylized facts about the dynamics of growth
and inequality, namely an increasing inequality for early stages of development
(i.e. for aprox. 50 years) and a shrinking inequality thereafter. He expected the
then underdeveloped countries to follow a similar pattern. He was, however,
skeptical of the quality of his data set and pointed out that ”the results [can be]
considered as preliminary informed guesses” [12, p. 4].
When providing a theoretical explanation for the income dynamics, he men-
tioned the importance of political interference, which is expected to become more
pronounced at later stages of development [12, p. 18]. The major mechanism for
him was, however, that more and more people move from the countryside to the
cities and move from the agricultural to the industrial sector. The result would be
an increase of the income share of the poorest in the cities, which is also related
to their increased political influence. Since the theory was first proposed, there
has been an extensive body of literature assessing the validity of the hypothesis.
The contributions can be grouped into theoretical assessments and empirical
studies.
Theoretical contributions The motivation for theoretical models yielding a
Kuznets relationship is the belief that empirical regularities as such (if they exist)
can only be interesting to the extent that ”they can be viewed as providing
some clues to the mechanisms through which the development process affects the
degree of inequality” [3, p. 338]. If such deeper mechanisms could be identified,
reasonable policy advice could be derived from the observations, a goal that has
been articulated throughout the entire literature on inequality.
The first important theoretical contribution is the paper of Lewis [13] in
which he coined the idea of dualistic development, i.e. the coexistence of two
sectors with important differences in at least one relevant dimension, mostly
productivity. In this paper, the author used the example of a capitalist and a
subsistence sector and as capital is only used in the first sector, it has a higher
output per head and higher wages. If more capital is produced, more workers
move from the subsistence to the capitalist sector and their income rises. Kuznets
idea of the population shift from agricultural to urban employment was certainly
inspired by this paper. The dualistic development models were further extended
and refined in further papers by Ranis and Fei (1961), Harris and Todaro (1970),
and Anand and Kanbur (1993).
An important step was the work of Robinson [15] who provided a more
formal two-sector model that deals with the inequality dynamics explicitly and
considers different income distributions in the sectors and a shift of the relative
population of one sector. He showed that such a setting will frequently produce
a Kuznets pattern. These theoretical considerations have been used to justify a
great set of policy measures.AR, while building on previous work in the political
science literature are the first who propose a political economy explanation for
the Kuznets curve.
Empirical contributions The empirical assessment of the Kuznets curve has
been characterized mainly by discussions about the quality of data and the choice
of estimation techniques. Although Kuznets himself used time series data for the
formulation of his theory, the vast majority of empirical work until recently has
focused on cross-sectional data , simply because other data was not available [3,
p. 307].
The most famous papers of the early era concluded with support for the
Kuznets relationship and triggered a huge policy debate [3]. Later, Anand and
Kanbur [5] took these papers as a starting point for their critique of the Kuznets
concept and highlighted the insufficient data and the lack of consensus about
the adequate estimation techniques. Until 1998, studies used exclusively cross-
sectional data and the resulting evidence was mixed, with a tendency to be
negative ([10], [14]). But the overall explanatory power of these cross-sectional
studies has frequently been questioned. The Kuznets hypothesis is about how
inequality develops within one country, not how it develop across countries, what
is tested if one relies on cross sectional data.
In 1996, Deininger and Squire (DS) were the first who provided a panel data
set that allowed the consideration of country specific effects [9]. After the release of
this first panel data set, a new wave of empirical studies about the Kuznets Curve
emerged. While DS find a statistically significant Kuznets-like relationship for a
pooled regression, they reject the presence of the Kuznets Curve when they use
fixed effects estimation. Savvides and Stengos (2000) using a threshold regression
model did not find evidence for the Kuznets relationship (or any other well-defined
relation) either and Higgins and Williamson (1999) found evidence for the curve
only if they controlled for demographic and globalization effects. Many authors
used the data set to argue for the importance of additional mechanisms such as
policies and openness, thereby rejecting the idea of an unconditional relationship
and explaining the resulting differences across countries ([16], [8]). Later, the data
set provided by DS received heavy critique for including inconsistent inequality
measures and providing in-accurate time series [6]. After this, almost no study
was published using the original data set any more. In contrast to earlier praxis,
some non-parametric studies were conducted using a refined version of the DS
data set, finding mixed evidence. Another issue not adequately dealt with in the
empirical literature is the time period over which the Kuznets Curve develops:
The existing theoretical contributions do not make concrete statements about
the time horizon of the Kuznets curve. Because of data scarcity most studies
assessed a time span of at most 40 years.
We conclude that the evidence for the Kuznets curve is very mixed. While
the evidence from cross-sectional studies cannot be trusted, more recent studies
suggest that Kuznets patterns can be observed in some individual countries,
which suggests an important role for country and region specific influences. There
has never been a trustworthy study considering the Kuznets curve over more
than 60 years, and considerations about data quality and adequate estimation
techniques are not yet fully resolved.
3 The theoretical model
Environment As in the original model [2] we consider an infinite-horizon
non-overlapping generation model in which parents invest in their offspring’s
education. In the benchmark model, a discrete population of N agents is divided
in two groups Nrt and N
p
t , respectively, the total number of rich and poor agents
in period t. In every period, every agent in the population meets another agent,
which might or not be from the same social class, and they beget two children.
It is assumed that 1/2 < Np0 / (N
p
0 +N
r
0 ) < 1 so that rich agents are a minority
elite in the beginning. Political power is initially concentrated in the hands of
the elite, where decisions will be taken by the median voter.
There is a unique consumption good y with price normalized to 1 and a
unique asset h. At t = 0 each agent i has human capital hip0 or h
ir
0 indexed with
p for poor agents and with r for rich agents. Note that we allow heterogeneity of
individual capital endowment within the two classes. Capital endowments are
drawn from a given Pareto distribution. The distinction between rich and poor
depends solely on their capacity to invest, represented by γ, in the education of
their children et+1.
The final good is produced by each agent using a linear technology. Individuals
can choose to allocate their capital between the formal sector, using a market
technology yimt = Ah
im
t , and the informal sector y
ib
t = Bh
ib
t , where h
im
t is the
amount of capital used in the formal sector or market production by agent i in
period t and hibt is the amount of capital he devotes to informal production. In
the model A > B, so production in the formal sector is always more productive.
Production in the informal sector has the advantage of being untaxed. The
relation between A and B will determine the maximum possible tax.
Aside from the heterogeneity of the agents, this formalization is the same as
that of AR [2].
Mating The mating mechanism is not included in the original paper. We consider
two agents in the population i, j ∈ {r, p} who select each other in order to form
a family. We denote the total probability of an agent i mating another agent j
as P iit . If mating is perfectly random, for a large N the probability of a poor
agent mating with a poor agent is λt = N
p
t / (N
p
t +N
r
t ). If mating is perfectly
assortative the probability of a poor agent mating with a poor agent is unity.
We define such probability as: P ppt = λt + α(1 − λt) = α + λt(1 − α) where
α is a measure of assortativity. Hence, when α = 0, random mating results,
while for α = 1, mating is perfectly assortative. Following the same logic, given
1−λt = N
r
t / (N
p
t +N
r
t ), the probability of a rich agent mating with a rich agent
is simply given by P rrt = (1− λt) + αλt = 1− λt(1− α)
The remaining probabilities are easily computed as P prt = (1−α)(1−λt) and
P rpt = (1− α)λt. α is then our inter-class mating parameter (assortativity).
In every period t the expected number of poor agents that mate outside their
class is Npt P
pr
t = N
p
t [1− (α+ λt(1− α))]. The expected number of rich agents
that mate outside their class is Nrt P
rp
t = N
r
t [1− (1− λt(1− α))]. It is easy to
see that expected values match.
The consumption-investment decision When two agents mate they become
a family, for which the total amount of wealth or final good is the sum of the
individual . For family z, made up of agents i and j yft = y
i
t + y
j
t , where for a
generic agent i, yit = y
im
t + y
ib
t ; this holds also for the agent j and, in principle,
is expression of both formal, m, and informal, b sector.
We assume that both parents are altruistic towards their children, regardless
their social origin. Accordingly, the decision about how much of the final good
to consume and how much to invest on the children education is jointly taken
between the two members of the family, ezt+1, following preferences,
uz(czt , e
z
t+1) =
{
(czt )
1−γ(ezt+1/2)
γ if eft+1z > 2
(czt )
1−γ if eft+1z ≤ 2
(1)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) , czt is the joint consumption of the parents in period t,
and ezt+1 is the investment in children education. These preferences imply an
investment rate equal to γ. We assume that parents invest the same in both
children, and so the utility function implies that a family will invest in education
if and only if the amount they can dedicate to this is larger than 2 (1 for each of
the children). Hence, the investment in offspring education will be
ezt+1 =
{
γyˆft if γyˆ
z
t > 2
0 if γyˆzt ≤ 2
(2)
For each new child, k, his human capital is given by
hkt+1 = max{1;Z(e
z
t+1/2)
β}, (3)
with Z > 1 and β < 1. This guarantees that accumulation of capital does not
continue indefinitely. Notice also that equation (3) guarantees that the minimum
amount of capital is 1.
Taxes and transfers No matter how forward-looking the parents would be for
their children, their investment decision depends on the tax regime. We assume
that taxes cannot be made person-specific and so they are proportional to the
amount of market-produced good. However, we have introduced the family unit
as agent performing the investment and voting decisions, then, for every family,
post-tax total income is simply yˆzt = (1− τt)Ah
zm
t + Tt + y
zb
t which simplifies to
yˆzt = (1− τt)Ah
zm
t + Tt (4)
if both parents produce all of their final goods in the formal sector. This will be
the case in equilibrium. τt is the tax rate and Tt, the transfer in each period, is
just given by
Tt =
∑N
i=1 y
zm
t
N
. (5)
The government’s budget constraint is given by NTt = τtAH
m
t , where H
m
t =∑m
i=1 h
im
t is the total production in the formal sector of the economy. Initially
the tax rate will be set by the median voter among rich agents. However, poor
agents can overthrow the existing government and take over the capital stock at
any period t. We assume that a revolution is triggered when more than half of
the population are materially better off than under the government of the rich
elite. If it is triggered, a revolution always succeeds, with a proportion 1− µ of
the capital stock being destroyed, and the remaining of it being shared equally
among the whole population. Therefore, µ indicates how costly the revolution
would be. Hence, if there is a revolution at period t, each family receives
yzt =
µAHt
N
(6)
in every future period. For simplicity, we assume that when deciding whether
agents prefer a revolution to take place, parents only think about their current
period endowment of final good, and not about their offspring’s.
For the median rich agent it will always be preferable to extent the franchise
and open the regime to democracy than to let the revolution happen (see section
4). Hence, if the revolution constraint binds at any given period, the elite will
introduce democracy, allowing the whole population to vote. The equilibrium
tax rate in the first democratic period will be
τˆ =
A−B
A
, (7)
the maximum tax level which does not imply agents allocating their capital
to production in the informal level. The timing of the model in each period is as
follows:
1. Parents die and the new generation receive education bequests. Upon receiving
the bequest, the new generation makes a marriage decision. Social mobility
can be improved by marriage.
2. The median voter among the rich agents sees everybody’s capital endowment
and finds out if a revolution is optimal for half of the population or more,
in which case he will choose to extend the franchise and open the regime to
democracy.
3. If the franchise has been extended, family, the two parents, decide if they
prefer to vote and select the optimal tax level or to support a revolution,
which never happens in equilibrium.
4. Each family allocates his capital stock between formal sector and informal
sector production and the family’s consumption and bequest levels.
4 Analysis
In this section we comment on the model assumptions and the case we choose
for the simulation.
For the assumptions of the model the reader is referred to AR[2]. The main
assumptions we keep are: the zero bequest assumption, the steady state assump-
tion, the fact that median rich agent prefers democracy to revolution, and initial
conditions which ensure that rich agents who marry other rich agents are able to
accumulate capital when there are not taxes. These conditions imply that poor
agents cannot accumulate wealth even in the absence of taxes, while economic
growth exists in the economy because rich agents start with less than steady
state human capital, and are able to accumulate wealth until they reach the
steady state level.
Autocracy, the rich accumulate and a rich agent and a poor agent to-
gether create a rich family Since in our model poor agents cannot accumulate
(unless they mate with a rich enough agent), and rich agents do (unless they
mate with a poor agent and they are not rich enough), for high enough α, i.e.
low enough inter-class mating, inequality will increase during the first periods,
before rich agents’ capital reaches the steady state level. The franchise will be
extended when wealth under autocracy becomes lower for at least half of the
population than what they would get after a revolution. Increasing inter-class
mating has two effects: On the one side it increases economic growth, on the
other it decreases inequality. When a rich agent and a poor agent together create
a rich family, the case chosen for our experiment, inter-class mating decreases
social inequality and increases economic growth. Then, the effects of introducing
inter-class mating (α < 1) in an environment in which the franchise would be
extended at a certain period t = k will be either:
1. To modify the time for a revolution to be optimal for at least half of the pop-
ulation, depending on whether the growth or the inequality effect dominates.
Our simulations suggest a domination of the growth effect, by increasing the
number of families which are able to accumulate wealth, increasing inter-class
mating increases total wealth in the autocratic regime, making the revolution
optimal for the poor proportion of the population earlier in time.
2. If inter-class mating is high enough, it might prevent the revolution constraint
from ever being triggered. Since we are assuming the median voter of the
rich takes the political decisions, democracy arrives just because all agents
become rich at some point.
Democracy When democracy is trivially reached because everybody becomes
rich or because everybody becomes poor, then there will be no taxes, and
consequently no political decision is taken. If democracy is reached through the
revolution, the median voter will choose the maximum possible tax rate in the
first democratic period. After this, inter-class mating and redistributive taxes
will decrease inequality. At some point, it might occur that the median voter is
not interested in positive taxes anymore. Formally, he chooses τ as to optimize:
τm ∈ Argmax (1− τt)Ah
m
t +
τmYt
N
(8)
So the optimal tax level is simply given by:
τm =
{
0 if Ahmt >
Yt
N
(A−B)
A
if otherwise
(9)
In the next section, we consider the implementation of the theoretical model as
an agent-based model.
5 Model Implementation
The model was implemented as a discrete-time, agent-based model written in
Python. The code is available at github [1]. The simulation began by instantiating
1,000 agents with a wealth distribution according to a Lorenz curve where δ = 0.82.
The simulation was executed for 200 timesteps. Agents were considered rich if
their initial wealth was above the poverty line 1/(γA)). After the initialization,
the simulation was executed in the following manner:
1. Each agent calculates post-tax income as (1− τ)Aw + r where w is wealth
and r is the transfer.
2. Each agent computes its savings as savings rate time post tax income.
3. A regime choice is made. If the richest poor agent’s potential income un-
der democracy (µAHt/Np) is greater than its current post-tax income, the
democracy is set and democracy continues through the execution.
4. If democracy is the current regime, the median agent, sorted by wealth,
sets the tax rate. The rate is zero if this agent has above average wealth or
(A−B)/A otherwise.
5. Transfers are calculated as r = τA/N .
6. In assortative mating, agents were paired based on the assortative parameter
and a new generation was generated where two ‘parents’ begat two ‘children’.
The children wealth were set as the average between their parent’s savings.
Each agent is classified as rich or poor depending on their wealth relative to
the poverty line.
7. In one-to-one mating, each agent generates a ‘child’ and its savings are passed
down.
8. This generation is processed just as in steps 1–8.
6 Results and Discussion
Parameterization and Sensitivity Analysis Where possible, we use empir-
ical data to inform the model parameterization. Some parameters are derived
from the same equations as given in AR, the remaining parameters were set
explicitly. Table 1 shows the origin of the parameters and values used in the
baseline scenario. In all runs N = 1, 000 and H = 1, 000.
Table 1. Parameter Values
Parameter Baseline Origin
Gini Coefficient 0.10 Informed by data [7]
δ: Lorenze curve parameter 0.82 Derived from other parameters
∆: % of poor 0.99 Model initial condition
I: Threshold agent 990 Derived from other parameters
Hm: Threshold agent (90th percentile) 1.87 Derived from other parameters
A: Parameter on modern sector production function 2.67 Derived from other parameters
B: Parameter on informal sector production function 2.13 Derived from other parameters
γ: Savings rate 0.20 Informed by data [7]
Z: Parameter on ospring human capital function 3.37 Set as initial condition
β: Exponent on ospring human capital function 0.75 Set as initial condition
µ: Proportion of economy remaining after revolution 0.85 Set as initial condition
τ : Tax rate 0.20 Informed by data [7]
For the sensitivity analysis we will consider the case of assortative mating and
how parameters other than α influence the results. Both the initial inequality and
the share of savings imposed to the economy determine the value of productivity
on the formal sector. Derived from that, the equations provide the productivity
on the informal sector. For δ close to 1 and derived productivity much higher than
empirically observed, inequality rises for all values of α. The model also allows
for a variation in the size of the economy that is left after a revolution. Results
vary little with most distributions showing an increase in inequality followed by
a short decrease before simulation is stopped with no more poor agents.
All considered the sensitivity analysis showed that the model is robust to
transformations in the parameters as long as they are within the constraints and
conditions imposed by the construction of the model itself.
Results Figure 1 presents the results associated with the baseline parameteri-
zation. For alternative values of α, we plot the time series of income inequality
and poverty. Income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient and poverty
is captured by the number of poor agents. Recall that α = 0 corresponds to
perfectly random mating, α = 1 corresponds to perfectly assortative mating, and
a unit of time corresponds to a generation. Three interesting conclusions emerge
from Fig. 1: higher assortativity in mating is associated with (1) a later onset
of the Kuznets curve; (2) greater inequality; and (3) an increased persistence of
poverty.
Fig. 1. Results. The Figure shows the evolution of the Gini coefficient for α = 0 to
α = 1 (i.e. from random to perfectly assortative mating). The width of the line is
proportional to the number of poor agents at a given time step.
Regarding the first conclusion, we see that for α = 1 the turning point occurs
at t = 8 whereas for α = 0 the turning point occurs at t = 2. Taking into account
all intermediate values of α reveals that the turning point increases monotonically
with assortativity in mating. The second conclusion follows immediately from
the first: for those values of α that correspond to a later onset of the Kuznets
Curve we see that higher levels of inequality are obtained. Specifically, we see
that for α = 1 peak inequality nearly reaches 0.70 whereas for α = 0 peak
inequality remains relatively low at approximately 0.25. Analogous to the first
conclusion, it is then evident that peak inequality increases monotonically in
the assortativity of mating. With respect to the third conclusion, it is evident
that for greater values of α poverty appears more persistent. That is, for α = 1
a non-negligible quantity of agents remain impoverished until t = 23 whereas
for α = 0 poverty is nearly completely eradicated by t = 2. Thus, in examining
all intermediate values of α we see that the third conclusion echoes that of the
first and second: we see yet another monotonic relationship as the duration of
poverty is increasing in α. Regarding intuition, first consider the case where
α = 1. In this scenario, marriage induces no social mobility and redistribution
can only occur with taxation under democracy. For a given parameterization,
the revolution constraint dictates that the franchise will be extended when per
capita wealth (i.e. H/Hp) is sufficiently greater than the wealth of the wealthiest
poor agent. The model outcomes for α = 1 thus depend primarily on the growth
rate of the economy relative to that of the wealthiest poor agent. When α = 0,
social mobility manifests through interclass marriage, which exerts influence on
the transition to democracy. From Fig. 1, we see that this case is characterized
by an immediate reduction in the number of poor agents, which exerts upward
pressure on per capita wealth through both decreasing Hp and increasing H.
This phenomenon leads to a more rapid transition to democracy and thus the
earlier onset of the Kuznets curve. For 0 < α < 1 we observe that the higher α,
the longer the Kuznets process lasts.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we present two major contributions to the debate around the theory
of the Kuznets Curve. The first is of theoretical interest. Although we have
only considered our baseline parameterization, our simulations show that social
institutions (namely, interclass marriage) appear to play an important role in
the timing or onset of the Kuznets Curve. Such social institutions may thus
represent a crucial source of omitted variable bias in the existing empirical and
theoretical work on the Kuznets Curve and future research may benefit from
its consideration. We were also able to provide insights about the dynamics of
the Kuznets relationship. Our model illustrates the possible variation in timing
of the Kuznets Curve and is more explicit about the time span in which the
relationship operates, namely up to 24 generations. If the model is calibrated
to empirical data, such a consideration can help derive the time horizon to be
considered in empirical studies and can thus help to bring more clarity to the
empirical assessment of the hypothesis.
The second contribution is of a methodological kind. Our model takes a purely
analytical model as a starting point, replicates the behavior of this model in an
agent-based simulation, and then relaxes some of the assumptions required to
keep the original model tractable. So it allows the consideration of the dynamics
explicitly. While there are only a few models of this kind (e.g. [4] and [11] for
the standard general equilibrium model), our model illustrates the usefulness of
this approach. The rigor of the previous analytical model is sustained, but in our
approach we are able to go beyond its application and assess its sensitivity to the
rigid assumptions previously made. Our agent-based model will allow for further
exploration of the factors affecting the timing and onset of the Kuznets Curve,
and can also be applied to understand economic inequality in different countries
with different levels of social mobility.
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